The Intentional-Attributive Definition of Art Abstract In this paper the author reviews the most debated theories of art in contemporary aesthetics and offers a new, intentional-attributive definition of art. He begins by expanding on Weitz's theory, after which he presents arguments that refute Weitz's claim that it is logically impossible to define art. The author then examines the institutional, the historical, and the aesthetic definitions of art and shows that all of these have weaknesses and none stands up completely to criticism. Taking into consideration the shortcomings of the examined definitions, he suggests his own definition of art: for all x, x is an artwork if the author of x mainly intended to reveal such properties of x, the perception of which would evoke experiences, containing ends in themselves. Key Words Definitions of art; art as an open concept; the institutional definition of art; the aesthetic definition of art; the historical definition of art; the intentional-attributive definition of art. Introduction In the Topics, Aristotle advanced the thesis that a definition was correct only if it contained information on natural, essential, and not accidental properties of a thing. He wrote, in particular, If a definition is an expression signifying the essence of the thing and the predicates contained therein ought also to be the only ones which are predicated of the thing in the category of essence; and genera and differentiae are so predicated in that category: it is obvious that if one were to get an admission that 2 so and so are the only attributes predicated in that category, the expression containing so and so would of necessity be a definition.1 Soon afterwards this thesis became canonical. Aristotle's thesis may be the reason why so many aestheticians sought to expose the nature of art2 in their definitions. Aristotle defined art as mimesis, or the reproduction of the world in images; Alexander Baumgarten, as a locus of perfection in its own right; Johann Gottsched, as a medium for conveying moral truth; Johann Winckelmann, as the imitation of beauty in nature; Kant, as a mode of representation which is intrinsically final; Schopenhauer, as the manifestation of the pure Platonic ideas; Leo Tolstoy, as the expression of a particular feeling experienced by an artist; Roger Fry and Clive Bell, as a significant form. However, all of these essentialist3 definitions either exclude some artworks from the extension of the concept of art, or include foreign items into it, or do both concurrently. For example, the definition of an artwork as a thing that expresses emotion is, on the one hand, too inclusive, because tears and grimaces express emotions, but do not belong to art; on the other hand, this same definition is too exclusive, because there are artworks that do not express emotions – for example, Joseph Kosuth's installation One and Three Chairs, Robert Rauschenberg's painting Erased De Kooning, John Cage's musical composition 4'33'', and even Johann Sebastian Bach's fugue G-dur BWV 541. The traditional project of finding the distinctive nature of art collapsed after Marcel Duchamp presented In Advance of the Broken Arm (1915) and other ready-mades (Bicycle Wheel (1916), Comb (1916), Traveler's Folding Item (1916), Apolinere Enameled (1916-1917), and Fountain (1917)) to the New York public. When whatever one likes can become art – a shovel, a wheel, a comb, a cover, an advertisement, a urinal – the very idea that artworks might share 3 common properties seems to be odd and dubious. What, for example, is common to such artworks as Hamlet, Campbell's Soup Cans, The Last Supper, Pierrot Lunaire (op. 15), the statue of David, Fountain, the Parthenon, Black Square, The Divine Comedy, Scaramouche, The Flanders Road, and Beethoven's Symphony No. 5 in C minor (op. 67)? These works have nothing in common, except perhaps the property of having been created by someone, but even this is not inherent in all artworks, as there is nonartificial art, for example – driftwood art4. No wonder that, in the aesthetic thought of 1940-50s, doubt arises as to whether the word 'art' can be defined at all. This doubt was formalized into a theory by Morris Weitz. In the article 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics' he claims that it is logically impossible to define the concept of art and proposes a non-definitional theory of art. In this paper, I will expand on Weitz's theory and present arguments that refute his claim that it is logically impossible to define the concept of art. I will then review the most debated theories in contemporary aesthetics – the institutional, the historical, and the aesthetic – and show that all of these have weaknesses and none stands up completely to criticism. In the final part of the paper, I will propose a new, intentional-attributive approach to defining art. 1. Weitz's Theory: Art as an Open Concept If Weitz is correct – if there is no property which belongs to all artworks – it follows that necessary and sufficient conditions for defining art do not exist. However, this reasoning is unlikely to persuade those who think philosophically. If we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions empirically, this does not mean that the conditions do not exist. Weitz therefore suggests a different, logical substantiation of his view. Each definition 'closes'5 the concept of art – setting strict norms and thus hindering new objects from being counted as art. However, art develops progressively: artworks that break rules, habits, and stereotypes